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In today’s dynamic ICT environments, the ability to control users’ access to
information resources and services becomes ever important. On the one hand,
it should adapt to the users’ changing needs; on the other hand, it should not
be compromised. Therefore, it is essential to have a flexible specification of
access control polices, incorporating dynamically changing context information.
The basic role-based access control (RBAC) approach has been the most widely
used access control approach and it typically evaluates access permissions through
roles assigned to users who are requesting access to resources. However, it
does not provide adequate functionality to incorporate and adapt to context
information which could have an impact on access decisions in context-aware
environments. Such environments need an access control approach with both
dynamic associations of user-role and role-permission capabilities. Towards
this end, this paper introduces a policy framework for context-aware access
control (CAAC) applications that extends the RBAC approach with context
information. The framework uses the relevant context information that reflects
the dynamically changing conditions of the environments to specify the CAAC
policies: the context-aware user-role and role-permission assignment policies. We
first present a formal policy model for our framework, specifying CAAC policies.
Using this model, we then introduce a policy ontology for modelling CAAC
policies and a policy enforcement architecture which supports access to resources
according to the dynamically changing context information. In addition, we
evaluate our policy ontology model and framework by considering (i) the completeness
of the ontology concepts, specifying different context-aware user-role and role-
permission assignment policies from the healthcare scenarios; (ii) the correctness
and consistency of the ontology semantics, assessing the core and domain-specific
ontologies through the healthcare case study; and (iii) the performance of the
framework by means of response time. The evaluation results demonstrate the
feasibility of our framework and quantify the performance overhead of achieving
context-aware access control to information resources.
Keywords: Context-awareness; Context-aware user-role assignment; Context-aware
role-permission assignment; Context-aware policies; Context-aware access control
1. INTRODUCTION
Access control is one of the fundamental security
mechanisms needed to protect resources against
unauthorized access according to a security policy.
1An earlier version of this paper appeared under the title “A
Semantic Policy Framework for Context-Aware Access Control
Applications” in the Proceedings of 12th IEEE International
Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and
Communications (TrustCom 2013). IEEE, pages 753-762, 16-18
July, 2013, Melbourne, Australia [1].
It verifies whether a user is allowed to carry out a
specific action on a resource. However, the access
control decision making processes in today’s dynamic
environments are not straightforward. In particular,
the expected security mechanisms towards this end
need to be context-aware in order to cope with highly
dynamic environments, thus taking into account the
context information [2, 3] (e.g., the location and request
time of the users) so that they can adapt themselves
to changing situations. This paradigm shift brings
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new challenges. On the one hand, users demand
access to resources in an anytime, anywhere fashion.
On the other hand, such access has to be carefully
controlled due to the additional challenges coming
with the dynamically changing environments. One
such challenge is how to incorporate the dynamically
changing context information into the access control
policies, to make appropriate and yet possibly different
decisions as the user’s contextual situation changes.
In the literature, a significant number of access
control approaches towards this end have been
developed over the last couple of decades ranging from
general approaches to application-specific approaches.
A recent study shows that role-based access control
(RBAC) [4, 5, 6] has become the most widely used
access control approach [7]. It has received broad
support as a general approach to access control, and
is well recognized for its many advantages in large-
scale authorization management [8]. RBAC typically
evaluates access permission through roles assigned to
users and each role assigns a collection of permissions
to users who are requesting access to the resources [4, 5].
It simplifies the management of access control policies
by creating user-role and role-permission mappings.
However, the basic RBAC approach does not provide
adequate functionality to incorporate and adapt to
the dynamically changing context information of users.
For example, a nurse can access a patient’s medical
information in the hospital while on duty, but should
not access such information while on a public bus
heading home.
Context-aware access control is a security mechanism
needed to provide flexible control of users’ access
to resources according to the currently available
context information [9]. Over the last decade, a
number of context-aware access control approaches
have been developed, extending the basic RBAC
approach by incorporating some specific types of
context information: temporal information (e.g., [10],
[11]), spatial information (e.g., [12]), and both
time and location (e.g., [13]). Recently, several
works have extended the basic RBAC approach,
considering some further context information other
than the temporal and spatial dimensions, such as
the resource and environment dimensions as well as
the user dimension [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. These
access control approaches are highly domain-specific
and still limited in capturing a wide range of important
context information for context-aware user-role and
role-permission assignments. This gap in the literature
suggests that there is a need for a new policy model and
framework for context-aware access control of software
services or information resources.
Consider the roles of patients and nurses in a
hospital context. A nurse Mary can be allowed to
access the medical health records of a patient Bob,
if she has been assigned to look after Bob but only
when she is located in the general ward and during
her ward shift time. That is, Mary can play the
nurse role and consequently can access Bob’s medical
health records if these contextual conditions are fulfilled.
The contextual conditions can be used for dynamically
performing user-role and role-permission assignments.
Therefore, an access controller needs to evaluate such
contextual conditions when enabling user-role and role-
permission assignments. As such kinds of dynamic
attributes (contextual conditions) need to be integrated
into the basic role-based access control approach, some
important issues arise to realize flexible and dynamic
access control. In general, in order to achieve context-
awareness and integrate the dynamic attributes into the
access control processes, the following research issues
need to be addressed:
(R1) How to specify context-aware user-role assign-
ment policies in order to dynamically assign users
to roles according to the relevant context infor-
mation?
(R2) How to specify context-aware role-permission
assignment policies in order to dynamically assign
roles to permissions according to the relevant
context information?
(R3) How to enforce and evaluate context-aware user-
role and role-permission assignment policies in
order to provide context-aware resource access
permissions to users?
1.1. The Contributions
To address the above-mentioned research challenges
and issues, the overall goal of this paper is to
develop a new Context-Aware Access Control (CAAC)
Policy Framework, that is capable of providing secure
access to resources and services according to the
dynamically changing contexts. It makes the following
key contributions:
(C1) Formal policy model. We propose a formal
policy model that extends the basic RBAC policy
model. The novel feature of our policy model is a
formal language for specifying the elements of our
framework, specifically addressing the following
aspects.
(i) Context-aware user-role assignment
(CAURA). Our policy model uses the relevant
context information to specify context-aware user-
role assignment policies. We take context
information to mean any information that can be
used to characterize the state of a relevant entity
or the state of a relevant relationship between
entities.
(ii) Context-aware role-permission assign-
ment (CARPA). Our policy model uses the
relevant context information to specify context-
aware role-permission assignment policies.
A Context-Aware Access Control Policy Framework 3
(iii) Context specification language (CSL).
Our policy model includes a simple language (con-
text specification language, CSL) for expressing
simple and complex contexts. The simple con-
texts are the basic low-level context information
that is directly obtained from entities and the
complex contexts are derived from other basic
or complex context information. The simple and
complex contexts are used to express the contex-
tual conditions (in the form of contextual expres-
sions) which are required in specifying context-
aware user-role and role-permission assignment
policies.
(C2) Policy ontology. Based on the above aspects,
we introduce a policy ontology for modelling
context-aware access control (CAAC) policies
(i.e., user-role and role-permission assignment
policies) that take into account the relevant
context information. The policy ontology
represents the basic elements using the ontology
languages OWL and SWRL.
(C3) Policy enforcement architecture. A policy
enforcement architecture (PEA) is introduced
that supports context-specific control over access
to information resources.
(C4) Evaluation. Other than the above three
contributions, this paper also justifies the
feasibility of the policy ontology model and
framework. The feasibility is demonstrated by
evaluating the completeness of the ontology model
components (ontology concepts), the correctness
and consistency of the ontology semantics, and
the performance of the policy framework in terms
of response time.
(i) Completeness. Covering our policy model
features, a detailed case study (including two test
cases) from the healthcare domain is presented
which demonstrates the completeness of our
proposed model components.
(ii) Correctness and Consistency. Assessing
the base and domain-specific ontologies and
executing some queries against the healthcare
case study, we have evaluated the correctness and
consistency of the ontology model semantics.
(iii) Performance. In order to demonstrate
the feasibility of our policy framework, we
have conducted some sets of experiments in
a healthcare environment and quantified the
performance overhead of our proposed framework.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents an application scenario of a healthcare
domain to motivate our work. Section 3 presents
a formal model for specifying the elements of our
policy framework. In Section 4, we introduce a
policy ontology that uses the semantic technologies for
specifying context-aware access control policies. In
order to support context-specific control over access
to information resources, Section 5 introduces a policy
enforcement architecture. Section 6 presents the
feasibility of our ontology-based policy framework
by considering four factors, namely, completeness,
correctness, consistency and performance. We review
the related work in Section 7. Finally, Section 8
concludes the paper and outlines future work.
2. RESEARCH MOTIVATION
In this section, we present a motivating scenario in
the domain of patient medical records management
and its associated requirements. We consider an
extended application scenario from our previous work
[19]. The objectives of this section are twofold. The
first objective is to analyze the scenario which illustrates
the need for the incorporation of dynamic contexts in
the access control process: context-aware user-role and
role-permission assignments. The second objective is to
identify the general requirements of developing context-
aware access control applications via the context-aware
user-role and role-permission assignments. We have
used suitable examples from this scenario throughout
the paper to explain the concepts of our framework.
2.1. Motivating Scenario
Let us consider the area of patient medical records
management (PMRM) in the healthcare domain as a
motivating scenario (Scene #1 and Scene #2) [19].
• Scene #1: The scenario begins with patient Bob
who is in the emergency room due to a heart attack.
While not being Bob’s usual treating physician,
Jane, a general practitioner at the hospital, is
required to treat Bob and needs to access Bob’s
emergency medical records from the emergency
room.
The different types of information involved in this
scenario are highly dynamic. Following the traditional
RBAC, the access control policy can either be too
restrictive and prevent Jane from accessing Bob’s
emergency medical records (i.e., only the treating
physician can), or allow Jane’s access but too liberal
and potentially compromising privacy (i.e., all general
practitioners can). As such, we need context-aware
access control (CAAC) policies. One of the relevant
policies (in natural language) is shown in Table 1.
• Scene #2: After getting emergency treatment,
Bob is shifted from the emergency department to
the general ward of the hospital and has been
assigned a registered nurse, Mary, who has regular
follow-up visits to monitor his health condition.
Mary needs to access several types of Bob’s medical
records (daily medical records, past medical history
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TABLE 1: A CAAC Policy
No Policy
Policy
#1
A general practitioner who is a treating doctor
of a patient, is allowed to read/write the
patient’s emergency medical records in the
hospital. However, all general practitioners
should be able to access the patient’s emergency
medical records in the hospital (by playing
the emergency doctor role), when the patient’s
health condition is critical.
TABLE 2: The CAAC Policies
No Policy
Policy
#2
A registered nurse within a hospital is granted
the right to read/write a patient’s daily medical
records during her ward duty time and from the
location where the patient is located.
Policy
#3
The nurse is allowed to read the patient’s past
medical history, if a general practitioner is
present at the same location.
Policy
#4
The nurse can access the patient’s private
medical records, if she is an assigned nurse of
that patient.
and private medical records) from the general ward
with certain conditions.
The different types of dynamically changing informa-
tion are also involved in this scenario (e.g., the pres-
ence of the doctor and the particular nurse-patient re-
lationship). Similar to Scene #1, the basic RBAC pol-
icy model is too restrictive to support access control to
Bob’s medical records when the context changes (e.g.,
Bob’s health condition is normal). As such, we need
context-aware access control (CAAC) policies. The cor-
responding context-aware access control policies (plain-
language policy rules) are shown in Table 2.
These context-aware access control policies are based
on a set of constraints on the user roles (e.g., general
practitioner, emergency doctor, registered nurse) and
services/resources (e.g., daily medical records, past
medical history, private medical records). These
policies need to be evaluated in conjunction with some
further dynamic context information (e.g., location,
ward duty time, interpersonal relationship).
The above mentioned PMRM (patient medical
records management) application is an example of how
to realize context-aware access control decisions. In
this application scenario, we have only considered some
context-aware access control policies for the general
practitioners and registered nurses (2 roles). For the
overall PMRM application, the number of policies can
be up to 500 with respect to 138 different health
professionals [20] (i.e., 138 roles).
2.2. Scenario Analysis
In this section, we analyze the application scenario to
capture the technical challenges to control access to
resources. As different types of context entities and
dynamically changing context information are involved
in the access control process, a number of important
technical challenges arise. The context-specific control
over access to patients’ medical records on the running
scenario works as follows.
Two different types of context information are
involved in the application scenario: simple and
complex contexts. For example, the identity/role of
the users and the location of the users are simple
contexts, and the interpersonal relationship between
the user and patient and the health status of the
patient are complex contexts. The complex contexts
are not obtained directly but can be derived from the
other available context information. For example, in
Scene #2, the derived relationship or interpersonal
relationship between the registered nurse and patient
can be derived from such context information as the
nurse’s profile, patient’s profile, etc. In general, how
to express the relevant contextual conditions in terms
of the different types of dynamic (basic and derived)
context information, which are to be integrated into the
access control process, is the first technical challenge.
Normally, only a patient’s treating physician is able
to access all the patient’s electronic health records. In
the mentioned emergency scenario (Scene #1), Jane,
while not being the treating doctor, can access Bob’s
emergency medical records from the emergency room
of the hospital by playing the emergency doctor role.
That is, Jane can play the emergency doctor role when
she is present in the emergency room and Bob’s health
condition is critical. On the other hand, she also can
play the general practitioner role. Thus, rather than
having static user-role assignment, how to dynamically
assign the roles to users according to relevant contextual
conditions is the second technical challenge.
In general, a registered nurse is granted the right to
read a patient’s daily medical records within a hospital.
But, she should only be able to read the medical records
from the location where the patient is located, during
her ward duty time. In the application scenario (Scene
#2), Mary, a registered nurse, can access Bob’s daily
medical records during her ward duty time because she
is present with Bob in the general ward. Furthermore,
when the situation changes (e.g., Bob’s health condition
becomes critical again, as in the Scene #1), decisions
on further access requests by Mary to Bob’s daily
medical records, may change accordingly (e.g., denied).
Therefore, how to dynamically assign the permissions to
roles based on the relevant contextual conditions is also
an important challenge.
2.3. General Requirements
In this section, we identify the general requirements
of developing context-aware access control applications,
based on the above motivating scenario.
Looking at the application scenario and technical
challenges identified in the previous sections, we make
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some important observations concerning context-aware
access control. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship
chain among user, role and resource.
The relationship chain contains two main parts: the
user-role mappings based on the relevant context infor-
mation, and the role-permission (resource access per-
mission) mappings based on the relevant context infor-
mation. To support such context-aware access control
in a computer application like the medical records man-
agement system, we need to consider the 3Ws: who
(the appropriate users by playing appropriate roles)
wants to access what (the appropriate parts of the re-
sources), and under what contextual conditions (the
dynamic context information). In particular, a context-
aware access control (CAAC) policy framework is re-
quired to control the access to resources in such appli-
cations by taking into account the different types of con-
text information that impact on the access control deci-
sions. The general requirements of developing a CAAC
policy framework are as follows:
(Req.1) Representation of contextual conditions:
What access control-specific basic and derived
(simple and complex) context information
should be considered to express the relevant
contextual conditions as part of building
context-aware access control? In general, there
is a need to formulate the contextual conditions
using the relevant context information, in order
to facilitate CAAC use.
(Req.2) Specification of user-role assignment
policies: How to specify the user-role
assignment policies based on the relevant
contextual conditions? In general, there are
different types of contexts involved in the user-
role mappings. For example, in the application
scenario, Mary can play the nurse role under
certain contextual conditions (if she is located
in the general ward, during her ward shift time
and Bob’s health condition is normal). If the
context/situation changes (e.g., Mary leaves
the general ward or Bob’s health condition
changes from normal to critical), the system
will not allow Mary to play the nurse role
(relative to Bob). Thus, there is a need to
specify dynamic user-role assignment policies
based on the relevant contextual conditions.
(Req.3) Specification of role-permission assign-
ment policies: How to specify the role-
permission assignment policies based on the
relevant contextual conditions? For example,
in the application scenario, when the con-
text/situation changes (e.g., Bob has come out
of emergency and moved to a general ward),
decisions on further access control to resources
(e.g., Jane’s access to Bob’s emergency medi-
cal records by playing the general practitioner
role) may change accordingly (e.g., denied).
Thus, there is a need to specify context-aware
role-permission assignment policies based on
the relevant contextual conditions.
(Req.4) Enforcement of access control policies:
How to evaluate the access control policies
based on the relevant contextual conditions to
realize a flexible and dynamic access control
scheme? There is a need for an access
controller to evaluate the context-aware user-
role and role-permission assignment policies
based on the relevant contextual conditions,
and manage re-authorization of access as
context/situation changes.
3. FORMAL POLICY MODEL FOR CAAC
3.1. Background
In this section, we discuss the main elements of the
traditional role-based access control model [4, 5] to
motivate the need for extending the basic RBAC model
to support context-aware access control requirements.
The traditional RBAC policy model has become the
most widely used access control paradigm for managing
and enforcing security in large-scale domains [7]. The
model has the following main elements: users, roles and
permissions. In RBAC, the users are human-beings,
who are assigned to roles based on their credentials
in the organizations, roles represent the job functions
within the organizations, describing the authorities and
responsibilities conferred on the users assigned to these
roles, and permissions are the approvals to perform
certain operations on resources.
In the RBAC policy model, the access permissions
are not assigned directly to the particular users, but
to the users’ roles. That is, the central notion of
RBAC is that users are assigned to appropriate roles,
permissions are assigned to roles, and users can have
appropriate permissions by being members of such roles.
RBAC ensures that only an authorized user is given
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access to a certain permission, and is based on the
user’s role in the organization. As such, it simplifies
the management of access control policies by creating
user-role and role-permission assignments. However,
the RBAC policy model does not directly adapt to
the requirements of the context-aware access control
applications (as presented in the previous section). In
particular, it does not provide adequate functionalities
to incorporate and adapt to the dynamically changing
context information.
In the next section, we introduce a new context-
aware access control (CAAC) policy framework for
information resources and software services. It
extends the basic concepts of RBAC to use dynamic
context information while making access control
decisions. The basic concepts of our policy framework
are that users are dynamically assigned to roles
by satisfying the relevant contextual conditions,
permissions (resource/service access permissions) are
dynamically assigned to roles by satisfying the relevant
contextual conditions, and users acquire appropriate
permissions by being members of such roles in a
dynamic manner.
3.2. Core Policy Model
Figure 2 shows the policy model of our CAAC
framework and the relationships between its elements.
Our policy model enables dynamic privileges assign-
ment in two steps, letting users to access resources and
services when certain contextual conditions are satis-
fied. In the first step, the users are dynamically assigned
to the roles when a set of conditions are satisfied. In the
next step, when the roles are activated, the permissions
(service access permissions) are assigned to these roles
when specific contextual conditions are satisfied. The
two main concepts are context-aware user-role assign-
ments and context-aware role-permission assignments.
Based on the formalization of the traditional role-
based access control (RBAC) model [5], we present a
formal definition of our policy model.
Definition 1. (Core Policy Model). The CAAC
policy model has the following elements:
• Basic elements: U,R,Res,Op, and Exp,
for users, roles, resources, operations and contex-
tual condition expressions, respectively;
• Composite elements:
RH,ResH,OpA,P,CAURA,CARPA, and Pol,
for role hierarchy, resource hierarchy, operation
assignments, permissions, context-aware user-
role assignments, context-aware role-permission
assignments and policies, respectively.
These elements are explained and further defined below.
First of all, we define the five basic elements of our
policy model:
• Users (U): U represents a set of users. The users
are service requesters interacting with a computing
system, whose access requests are being controlled.
U = {u1, u2, u3, ..., um} (1)
• Roles (R): R represents a set of roles. The roles
reflect users’ job functions within the organization
(e.g., healthcare domain).
R = {r1, r2, r3, ..., rn} (2)
• Resources (Res): Res represents a set of
resources. The resources are the objects
protected by access control that represent the
data/information container (e.g., the different
parts of a patient’s medical records).
Res = {res1, res2, res3, ..., reso} (3)
• Operations (Op): Op represents a set of
operations on the resources. The operations are
the actions that can be executed on the resources,
for instance, read and write.
Op = {op1, op2, op3, ..., opp} (4)
• Expressions (Exp): Exp represents a set of
contextual expressions. The expressions are
used to express the contextual conditions (using
relevant context information) in order to specify
the context-aware user-role and role-permission
assignment policies. We use the terms of
contextual expression and contextual condition
interchangeably. The contextual expressions are
specified in the context specification language
(CSL).
Exp = {exp1, exp2, exp3, ..., expq} (5)
A detailed analysis of contextual expressions is given
in the next section (see Section 3.3).
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The policy model has seven other elements (which
are related to the above basic elements). These ele-
ments are defined formally as follows:
• Role Hierarchy (RH): RH is a partial order on
R to serve as the role hierarchy, which supports the
concept of role inheritance. The role is considered
in a hierarchical manner in that if a permission
assigned to a junior role, then it is also assigned to
all the senior roles of that role.
RH ⊆ R×R (6)
• Resource Hierarchy (ResH): ResH is a partial
order on Res to serve as the resource hierarchy,
which supports a user’s access to the resources
at different granularity levels. The resource is
considered in a hierarchical manner in that if a
user has the right to access a resource at a higher
granularity level, then he also has the right to
access that part of resource at a lower granularity
levels.
ResH ⊆ Res×Res (7)
• Operation Assignment (OpA): OpA is a many-
to-many operation-to-resource mapping. Each
operation could be associated with many resources,
and each resource could be manipulated by many
operations.
OpA ⊆ Res×Op (8)
• Permission (P): P represents a set of permis-
sions. The permissions are the approvals to per-
form certain operations on resources by the users
who initiate access requests.
P = {(resi, opj)|resi ∈ Res, opj ∈ Op} (9)
Where i = {1, 2, 3, ..., o}, j = {1, 2, 3, ..., p}, Res
is a set of resources, and Op is a set of operations
on the resources.
The permission (P) is a subset of operation
assignment (OpA),
P ⊆ OpA (10)
• Context-Aware User-Role Assignment
(CAURA): CAURA is a context-aware user-role
assignment relation, which is a many-to-many
mapping between users and roles, when a set of
dynamic contextual conditions are satisfied.
CAURA ⊆ U ×R× Exp (11)
• Context-Aware Role-Permission Assign-
ment (CARPA): CARPA is a context-aware
role-permission assignment relation, which is a
many-to-many mapping between roles and permis-
sions, when a set of dynamic contextual conditions
(contextual expressions) are satisfied.
CARPA ⊆ R× P × Exp (12)
• Policies (Pol): Pol represents a set of context-
aware access control policies. It includes the
context-aware user-role assignment (CAURA) poli-
cies and context-aware role-permission assignment
(CARPA) policies.
Pol = PolCAURA ∪ PolCARPA (13)
The main concepts that we have introduced
in our policy model are the context-aware user-
role assignments and context-aware role-permission
assignments. They incorporate dynamically changing
contextual conditions (in the form of contextual
expressions) into RBAC for dynamic user-role and role-
permission assignments.
In the following sections, we further define and dis-
cuss context information, context specification language,
CAURA policy specification and CARPA policy specifi-
cation.
3.3. Context Information and Context Specifi-
cation Language (CSL)
3.3.1. Context Information
In the context-awareness literature, many researchers
have defined the concept of context. According to
Dey, context is any information that can be used to
characterize the situation of an entity (person, place
or object) [2]. For our purpose, however, existing
context definitions are not specific enough to specify
the different types of entities for access control and the
context information characterizing these entities. In our
earlier work [21, 19], we define context as any relevant
information about the state of an entity relevant to
access control or the state of a relevant relationships
between persons (as entities).
We classify context information into simple context
and complex context, i.e., context information (C) is the
set of all simple contexts (Cs) and all complex contexts
(Cc).
C = Cs ∪ Cc (14)
A simple context ‘cs’ (cs ∈ Cs) is an attribute of an
entity that directly depends on a raw context fact. It
characterizes the state of an entity, based on a single
context information source.
Cs = {cs1, cs2, cs3, ..., css} (15)
In our application scenario (presented in Section 2),
user identity is a simple context that represents a
property of the user (resource requester).
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A complex context ‘cc’ (cc ∈ Cc) is a combination
of context facts. It depends on the values of attributes
that characterize the state of one or more entities, based
on the one or more context information sources.
Cc = {cc1, cc2, cc3, ..., cct} (16)
In our application scenario, interpersonal relationship
is a complex context that represents a property which
is related to the user and resource owner. The
interpersonal relationship between user and owner can
be inferred from available context information (e.g., the
profile information of the user and owner).
3.3.2. Context Specification Language
Our policy model includes a simple language (context
specification language, CSL) for expressing contextual
conditions based on the simple and complex contexts.
This language is used to formally specify the constraints
in context-aware user-role and role-permission assign-
ment policies.
Definition 2. (Simple Context Expression (Exps)).
Let E be the set of context entities, and Cs be the set
of simple context information, then we define a simple
context expression as a tuple in the form of
< e.cs, rel.op, v >, [where, e ∈ E, cs ∈ Cs, and
rel.op ∈ {<,≤, >,≥,=, 6=}] (17)
In the above expression, ‘e’ denotes a context entity,
‘cs’ denotes a simple context attribute, ‘e.cs’ denotes a
simple context about an entity (i.e., context attribute
of an entity), ‘rel.op’ denotes a relational operator (the
set of ‘rel.op’ can be extended to accommodate user-
defined operators (e.g., ‘entering’), and ‘v’ denotes the
value assigned to the context attribute ‘cs’ of context
entity ‘e’.
Example 1. A patient or resource owner’s heart rate
is less than 65 (or is abnormal), which is represented as,
exps1 , (Owner.heartRate < 65) or
exps1 , (Owner.heartRate = “Abnormal”)
(18)
A simple context expression is a simple contextual
constraint in the CSL language. It is possible
to construct more complex expressions by logically
combining (conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨), and
negation (¬)) simple constraints.
Definition 3. (Complex Context Expression
(Expc)). A complex context expression can be de-
fined by performing logical composition on simple or
complex context expressions.
expc1 , exp1 ∧ exp2
expc2 , exp3 ∨ exp4
expc3 , ¬ exp5
(19)
where exp1, exp2, exp3, exp4, and exp5 are already
defined simple or complex context expressions, and
expc1, expc2, and expc3 are newly defined complex
context expressions.
Example 2. Let us consider an access control policy
from our application scenario: Mary can play the
registered nurse role during her ward duty time and
when she is located in the general ward. Using logical
composition, the contextual condition of this policy can
be represented as
expc1 , ((User.locationAddress = “GeneralWard”)
∧ (User.requestT ime = “DutyT ime”))
(20)
Example 3. A registered nurse (who is assigned for a
patient) is granted the right to access the patient’s daily
medical records when the patient’s health condition
is normal. Using logical composition, the contextual
condition of this policy can be represented as
expc2 , ((interRelationship(User,Owner) =
“AssignedNurse”) ∧ (Owner.healthStatus =
“Normal”))
(21)
Definition 4. (Contextual Expression (Exp)). By
definitions 2 and 3, a contextual expression exp (exp ∈
Exp) is either a simple context expression or a complex
context expression.
exp , exps | expc (22)
Where exps denotes a simple context expression and
expc denotes a complex context expression.
3.4. Context-Aware User-Role Assignment
(CAURA) Policy Specification
Our policy model extends the concept of user-role
assignment in RBAC, by introducing the concept of
context-aware user-role assignment (CAURA). The
traditional RBAC model defines user-role assignment
(URA) simply as a mapping of users to roles.
URA ⊆ U ×R (23)
We have extended this URA notion by introducing
dynamic contextual expressions (integrating relevant
context information).
Definition 5. (CAURA). Let U be the set of users,
R be the set of roles and Exp be the set of contextual
expressions, then CAURA is a many-to-many user-role
assignment relation associated with certain contextual
expressions.
CAURA = {(u1, r1, exp1), (u2, r2, exp2),
... , (ui, rj , expk)} ⊆ U ×R× Exp
(24)
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TABLE 3: Context-Aware User-Role Assignment
User Role Contextual Expression
Jane EmergencyDoctor (User.locationAddress =
“EmergencyRoom”)
Mary RegisteredNurse (User.locationAddress =
“GeneralWard”) ∧
(User.requestT ime =
“DutyT ime”)
where ‘u’ denotes a user (u ∈ U), ‘r’ denotes a
role (r ∈ R) and ‘exp’ denotes a contextual expression
(exp ∈ Exp).
Context-aware user-role assignments can be ex-
pressed in tabular form (see Table 3). For example, the
second row in Table 3 describes when Mary is present
in the general ward and during her ward duty time, she
can be assigned to the registered nurse role.
Definition 6. (CAURA Policy). Let U be the set
of users, R be the set of roles and Exp be the set of
contextual expressions. A CAURA policy (polCAURA)
is defined as follows:
a user ‘u’ can be assigned the role ‘r’
if and only if (u, r, exp) ∈ CAURA
or alternatively
polCAURA ∈ CAURAPolicy
⇐⇒ (u, r, exp) ∈ CAURA
where ‘u’ is a user (u ∈ U), ‘r’ is a role (r ∈ R), and
‘exp’ is a contextual expression (exp ∈ Exp) defined in
the CSL.
Based on the CAURA policy definition (see Definition
6), the rule (shown in Table 4) expresses the context-
aware user-role assignment policy, i.e., a User u (u ∈ U)
can play a Role r (r ∈ R) under contextual condition
exp (exp ∈ Exp).
Example 4. Let us consider an access control policy
from our application scenario: Mary can play the
registered nurse role during her ward shift time and
when she is located in the ward. In Table 4, Role
‘r’ denotes RegisteredNurse role, User ‘u’ is Mary,
and Contextual Condition ‘exp’ is the combination of
the raw facts of the ward ‘duty time’ and ‘location’ of
Mary. The contextual condition is already expressed in
Formula (20) in CSL (Section 3.3).
3.5. Context-Aware Role-Permission Assign-
ment (CARPA) Policy Specification
Similar to context-aware user-role assignment, our pol-
icy model extends the concept of role-permission as-
signment in RBAC with contextual expressions, called
context-aware role-permission assignment (CARPA).
Traditional RBAC model defines role-permission as-
signment (RPA) simply as a mapping of roles to per-
missions.
RPA ⊆ R× P (25)
We have extended this RPA notion by introducing
dynamic contextual expressions (integrating context
information).
Definition 7. (CARPA). Let R be the set of roles,
Exp be the set of contextual expressions, and P be
the set of permissions, then CARPA is a many-to-
many role-permission assignment relation associated
with certain contextual expressions.
CARPA = {(r1, p1, exp1), (r2, p2, exp2),
... , (ri, pj , expk)} ⊆ R× P × Exp
(26)
where ‘p’ denotes a permission (p ∈ P ), ‘r’ denotes a
role (r ∈ R) and ‘exp’ denotes a contextual expression
(exp ∈ Exp).
Definition 8. (CARPA Policy). Let R be the set of
roles, P be the set of permissions, and Exp be the set of
contextual expressions. A CARPA policy (polCARPA)
is defined as follows:
a role ‘r’ can be assigned the permission ‘p’
if and only if (r, p, exp) ∈ CARPA
or alternatively
polCARPA ∈ CARPAPolicy
⇐⇒ (r, p, exp) ∈ CARPA
where ‘r’ is a role (r ∈ R), ‘p’ is a permission (p ∈ P ),
and ‘exp’ is a contextual expression (exp ∈ Exp) defined
in the CSL.
Based on the CARPA policy definition, the following
rule (shown in Table 5) expresses the context-aware
role-permission assignment policy.
Example 5. In our application scenario, let us
consider an access control policy: A registered nurse,
who is assigned for a regular follow-up visit to monitor
a patient’s health condition, can access the patient’s
daily medical records (DMR) when the patient’s health
status is normal. In Table 5, Role ‘r’ denotes
RegisteredNurse role, permission is (DMR, Write)
(i.e., Resource ‘res’ is DMR and Operation ‘op’
is Write), and Contextual Condition ‘exp’ is the
combination of the following raw facts: the nurse is
‘assigned’ for the patient and the patient has ‘normal
health status’. The contextual condition is already
expressed in Formula (21) in the CSL (Section 3.3).
4. ONTOLOGY-BASED POLICY MODEL
FOR POLICY SPECIFICATION
We have in the last section defined the formal policy
model to specify context-aware user-role and role-
permission assignment policies. Based on this formal
model, in this section, we present an ontology-based
policy model for our framework to provide the practical
basis for realizing our CAAC framework, as the policy
ontology can be directly included in its implementation
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TABLE 4: Context-Aware User-Role Assignment Policy
If
CAURAPolicy(caura) ∧ User(u) ∧ Role(r) ∧ ContextualCondition(exp) ∧
hasUser(caura, u) ∧ hasRole(caura, r) ∧ hasCondition(caura, exp)
Then
caura(u, r)
TABLE 5: Context-Aware Role-Permission Assignment Policy
If
CARPAPolicy(carpa) ∧ Role(r) ∧ Resource(res) ∧ Operation(op) ∧
ContextualCondition(exp) ∧ hasRole(carpa, r) ∧ hasResource(carpa, res) ∧
hasOperation(carpa, op) ∧ hasCondition(carpa, exp)
Then
carpa(r, p)
(see the next section). The main goal of our policy
ontology is to specify the two sets of context-aware
access control policies by incorporating the dynamically
changing context information.
4.1. Design Considerations
To simplify the management of access control policies,
various policy languages have been proposed in the
literature. Our goal in this paper is to provide a way
in which context-aware access control policies can be
specified, which incorporate context information. To
be of practical use, it must be expressive enough to
specify the policies in an easy and natural manner.
Experience from existing research (e.g., [22], [23]) shows
that ontologies are very suitable for modeling dynamic
information for ubiquitous computing applications.
Furthermore, the expressivity of the ontology language
OWL [24] can be extended by incorporating SWRL
rules [25]. As such, we use the ontology languages OWL
and SWRL as the CAAC policy language.
Our policy ontology specifies two sets of context-
aware access control (CAAC) policies: (i) the
context-aware user-role assignment policies and (ii)
the context-aware role-permission assignment policies.
The basic concepts of these CAAC policies are that
users are dynamically assigned to roles by satisfying
the relevant contextual conditions, permissions are
dynamically assigned to roles by satisfying the relevant
contextual conditions, and users acquire resource access
permissions by having corresponding roles.
Figure 3 shows the top-level conceptual view of our
policy ontology. The ontology defines the following
concepts under the hierarchy of CAACPolicy, namely
CAURAPolicy and CARPAPolicy. The CAURAPolicy
models context-aware user-role assignment policies and
CARPAPolicy models context-aware role-permission
assignment policies.
CAACPolicy
CAURAPolicy
has
CARPAPolicy
has
FIGURE 3: The Core Policy Ontology
4.2. CAURA Policy Ontology
The CAURA policy ontology, representing context-
aware user-role assignment policies, has been designed
by answering the following questions.
• Who is requesting resource/service access (re-
quester or user)?
• What role does the user play (role)?
• What is the dynamic context information that is
relevant for this user-role assignment (contextual
condition)?
4.2.1. Core Concepts
The CAURA policy ontology, as depicted in Figure 4,
has the following core concepts which are organized
into a CAURAPolicy hierarchy: User, Role and
ContextualCondition. The ContextualCondition class
has the concept ContextInfo, which has two subclasses
SimpleContext and ComplexContext.
For simplicity, we define the CAURA ontology
concepts as follows:
The basic classes User, Role and ContextualCondition
form a CAURAPolicy (see Definition 9).
Definition 9. (Basic Class).
CAURAPolicy ⊆ User ×Role×
ContextualCondition
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TABLE 6: Domain and Range Restrictions for CAURA Object Properties
Object Property Domain Range Description
hasCondition CAURAPolicy ContextualCondition A CAURA policy has the contextual conditions
hasRole CAURAPolicy Role A CAURA policy has the roles
hasUser CAURAPolicy User A CAURA policy has the users
hasContext ContextualCondition ContextInfo A contextual condition is formed by the context
information which can be either a simple context
or a complex context
plays User Role A user can play a role
CAURAPolicy
User
hasUser
hasContext Role
hasRole
roleIdentity
Contextual 
Condition
hasCondition
userIdentity
ContextInfo
Simple 
Context
Complex 
 Context
is-ais-a
plays
FIGURE 4: The CAURA Policy Ontology
TABLE 7: CAURA Data Type Properties
Data Type Property Domain
userIdentity User
roleIdentity Role
The ContextInfo class has two subclasses SimpleCon-
text and ComplexContext (see Definition 10). A sub-
class SimpleContext or ComplexContext can have fewer
or equal elements to the basic class ContextInfo.
Definition 10. (Subclass).
SimpleContext ⊆ ContextInfo
ComplexContext ⊆ ContextInfo
The relationships in CAURAPolicy ontology are
represented by two types of properties, i.e., object and
data type properties.
The domain and range of object properties are
specified in Table 6.
The class User has userIdentity data property and
the Role class has a data property named roleIdentity
(see Table 7).
Overall, a CAURA policy captures the 3W
dimensions which can be read as follows:
a CAURAPolicy specifies that a user (userI-
dentity) can play a role (roleIdentity) by sat-
isfying the relevant contextual conditions.
The details of OWL-based CAURA policy specifica-
tions can be found in Appendix A.
4.2.2. An Example CAURA Policy
Example 6. Let us consider an access control policy
for the registered nurse presented in Section 2: a user
Mary can play the registered nurse (RN) role (in order
to access a patient’s daily medical records), during her
ward duty time (DT) from the general ward (GW) of
the hospital, where the patient is located.
In this policy, the access decision is based on the
following policy constraints: who the user is (user’s
identity), what role she can play (role’s identity), and
under what contextual conditions (the locations of
the user and patient, and the request time of the user).
The CAURA policy for the registered nurses in OWL is
shown in Table 8. The core policy concepts are specified
in Line# 1 to 6, the user specification is shown in Line#
7 to 9, the role specification (registered nurse) is shown
in Line# 10 to 12, and the contextual condition (a
complex context cc1) is specified in Line# 13 to 15.
The contextual condition cc1 (registered nurses
during ward duty time from the general ward of
the hospital) is already expressed in Formula (20),
using logical composition (see Section 3.3). The
following OWL code shows its ontological definition (see
Definition 11).
Definition 11. (‘cc1’ Contextual Condition Defini-
tion).
<ComplexContext rdf:ID=“ComplexContext cc1”>
<User.locationAddress rdf:datatype
=“&xsd;string”>GeneralWard
</User.locationAddress>
<User.requestTime rdf:datatype
=“&xsd;string”>DutyTime
</User.requestTime>
</ComplexContext>
4.3. CARPA Policy Ontology
The CARPA policy ontology, representing context-
aware role-permission assignment policies, has been
designed by answering the following questions.
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TABLE 8: An Example CAURA Policy for Playing Registered Nurse Role
1 <CAURAPolicy rdf:ID=“caura1”>
2 <hasUser rdf:resource=“#User RegisteredNurse DB”/>
3 <hasRole rdf:resource=“#Role RegisteredNurse”/>
4 <hasCondition rdf:resource=“#ContextualCondition ContextInfo”/>
6 </CAURAPolicy>
7 <User rdf:ID=“User RegisteredNurse DB”>
8 <userIdentity rdf:datatype=“&xsd;string”>Mary00X</userIdentity>
9 </User>
10 <Role rdf:ID=“Role RegisteredNurse”>
11 <roleIdentity rdf:datatype=“&xsd;string”>RN00X</roleIdentity>
12 </Role>
13 <ContextualCondition rdf:ID=“ContextualCondition ContextInfo”>
14 <hasContext rdf:resource=“#ComplexContext cc1”/>
15 </ContextualCondition>
TABLE 9: Domain and Range Restrictions for CARPA Object Properties
Object Property Domain Range Description
hasDecision CARPAPolicy AccessDecision A CARPA policy has the access decision
hasPermission CARPAPolicy Permission A CARPA policy has a permission
hasOperation Permission Operation A CARPA policy has a permission to access/perform
different operations on resource
hasResource Permission Resource A CARPA policy has a permission to access resource
isOwnedBy Resource Owner A resource is owned by an owner
CARPAPolicy
Permission
hasPermission
hasContext
Role
hasRole
roleIdentity
Contextual 
Condition
hasCondition
resourceIdentity
Operation
Resource
decision  (=1)
action
AccessDecision
hasOperation
hasResource
hasDecision
ContextInfo
Simple 
Context
is-a
is-a
Complex 
Context
isOwnedBy
Owner
ownerIdentity
FIGURE 5: The CARPA Policy Ontology
• Who is requesting access by playing what role
(role)?
• What type of object is being requested (resource
or service)?
• What is the dynamic context information that
is relevant for this role-permission assignment
(contextual condition)?
4.3.1. Core Concepts
A graphical representation of the ontology is shown in
Figure 5. The ontology has the following core con-
cepts, which are organized into a CARPAPolicy hier-
TABLE 10: CARPA Data Type Properties
Data Type Property Domain
decision AccessDecision
resourceIdentity Resource
ownerIdentity Owner
action Operation
TABLE 11: Cardinality Constraint
Property Possible Values Description
decision Granted Access request is
granted
decision Denied Access request is denied
archy, including such concepts as Role, Permission, Re-
source, Operation, AccessDecision and ContextualCon-
dition. The ContextualCondition class has the concept
ContextInfo which in turn has two subclasses Simple-
Context and ComplexContext.
The CARPAPolicy ontology has object and data type
properties. The domain and range of object properties
are specified in Table 9.
The data type properties of the CARPAPolicy
ontology are shown in Table 10.
A CARPA policy has exactly one access decision
value (“Granted” or “Denied”). To specify this
cardinality constraint in our CARPA policy ontology
(see Figure 5), we consider a class AccessDecision, and
its data type property decision. The possible access
decision values are summarized in Table 11.
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Overall, a CARPA policy captures the 3W
dimensions which can be read as follows:
a CARPAPolicy specifies that a user who is
playing a role has AccessDecision (“Granted”
or “Denied”) to which parts (resourceIdentity)
of a Resource for a specific action (“Read”
or “Write” Operation) or a range of actions
under what contextual conditions.
The details of OWL-based CARPA policy specifica-
tions can be found in Appendix B.
4.3.2. An Example CARPA Policy
Example 7. Again consider the access control policy
for the registered nurses (presented in Section 2): a
registered nurse, who is assigned for a regular follow-up
visit to monitor a patient’s health condition, can access
the patient’s daily medical records (DMR) when the
patient’s health status is normal.
In this policy, the access decision is based on the
following policy constraints: who the user is (user’s
role), what resource is being requested (resource’s iden-
tity), and under what contextual conditions the
user sends the request (the interpersonal relationship
between user and resource owner and the health status
of the patient). The CARPA policy for the registered
nurses in OWL is shown in Table 12. The policy states
that the registered nurse (the assigned nurse) can access
the patient’s daily medical records when the patient’s
health condition is normal. The core policy concepts are
specified in Line# 1 to 6, the role specification (regis-
tered nurse) is shown in Line# 7 to 9, the permission
specification (daily medical records on write operation)
is shown in Line# 10 to 19, and the access decision
(granted decision) is specified in Line# 20 to 22. The
contextual condition (a complex context cc2) is specified
in Line# 23 to 25.
The contextual condition cc2 is already expressed in
Formula (21), using logical composition (see Section
3.3). Definition 12 shows its ontological definition.
Definition 12. (‘cc2’ Contextual Condition Defini-
tion).
<ComplexContext rdf:ID=“ComplexContext cc2”>
<interRelationship(User, Owner)
rdf:datatype=“&xsd;string”>AssignedNurse
</interRelationship(User, Owner)>
<Owner.healthStatus
rdf:datatype=“&xsd;string”>
Normal</Owner.healthStatus>
</ComplexContext>
The details of context information modelling can be
found in the ontology-based context model, which has
been presented in our earlier work [21, 19].
CAAC
PEP
 ResourcesUsers
CAAC
PDP CAURA
Policies
Context
Repository
 CARPA
Policies
Environments
Context information Context information
Context information
FIGURE 6: The Policy Enforcement Architecture
5. POLICY ENFORCEMENT ARCHITEC-
TURE
This section introduces the policy enforcement architec-
ture (PEA) of our framework and describes its compo-
nents. PEA extends our previous implementation pro-
totype, which is reported in [19].
Figure 6 gives an overview of the PEA architecture.
It includes four main components: Context Repository,
CAAC Policies (CAURA and CARPA policies), CAAC
PDP (policy decision point), and CAAC PEP (policy
enforcement point).
The Context Repository stores the access control-
specific context information in the form of a context on-
tology, including user-centric context information (e.g.,
requester profile), resource-centric context information
(e.g., resource profile), and environment-centric con-
text information (e.g., user’s location, and interper-
sonal relationship between user and owner). Conse-
quently, the contextual conditions for the user-role and
role-permission assignments are specified in the Con-
text Repository in terms of relevant context information.
The detailed implementation of the context ontology for
access control is the out of scope of this paper, which
can be found in our earlier paper [21, 19].
The CAURA Policy and CARPA Policy ontologies
store two sets of policies that show a mapping between
users and roles, and roles and permissions respectively,
according to the relevant contextual conditions that are
in effect. We have used the Prote´ge´-OWL API [26] to
implement the context and policy ontologies. We have
used the Jess Rule Engine [27] for executing the SWRL
rules (user-defined reasoning rules) [25].
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TABLE 12: An Example CARPA Policy for the Registered Nurse
1 <CARPAPolicy rdf:ID=“carpa1”>
2 <hasRole rdf:resource=“#Role RegisteredNurse”/>
3 <hasPermission rdf:resource=“#Permission DMR Write”/>
4 <hasCondition rdf:resource=“#ContextualCondition ContextInfo”/>
5 <hasDecision rdf:resource=“#AccessDecision Granted”/>
6 </CARPAPolicy>
7 <Role rdf:ID=“Role RegisteredNurse”>
8 <roleIdentity rdf:datatype=“&xsd;string”>RN00X</roleIdentity>
9 </Role>
10 <Permission rdf:ID=“Permission DMR Write”>
11 <hasResource rdf:resource=“#Resource DMR”/>
12 <hasOperation rdf:resource=“#Operation Write”/>
13 </Permission>
14 <Resource rdf:ID=“Resource DMR”>
15 <resourceIdentity rdf:datatype=“&xsd;int”>2</resourceIdentity>
16 </Resource>
17 <Operation rdf:ID=“Operation Write”>
18 <action rdf:datatype=“&xsd;string”>Write</action>
19 </Operation>
20 <AccessDecision rdf:ID=“AccessDecision Granted”>
21 <decision rdf:datatype=“&xsd;string”>Granted</decision>
22 </AccessDecision>
23 <ContextualCondition rdf:ID=“ContextualCondition ContextInfo”>
24 <hasContext rdf:resource=“#ComplexContext cc2”/>
25 </ContextualCondition>
We have implemented the CAAC PDP and CAAC
PEP in Java to evaluate the policies for making context-
aware access control decisions. Once the CAAC PEP
receives the user’s request for resource access, it queries
the CAAC PDP for the applicable policies and currently
available context information in the ontologies. The
CAAC PDP makes the decision according to the policies
and context information. Finally, the CAAC PDP
informs the CAAC PEP of the decision, and the CAAC
PEP enforces the decision by granting or denying the
users access request.
6. THE EVALUATION OF THE
ONTOLOGY-BASED POLICY MODEL
AND FRAMEWORK
In this section, we demonstrate the feasibility of
our proposed ontology-based policy framework. We
aim to show that the policy ontology model and
framework offers complete and correct semantics and
shows its efficiency in terms of response time. Our
evaluation considers the following factors, namely,
the completeness of the model components (ontology
concepts), the correctness and consistency of the
ontology semantics and the performance of the
framework in terms of response time.
6.1. Completeness
First, we evaluate the completeness of our policy on-
tology model. As such, we in this section present the
patient medical records management (PMRM) applica-
tion, covering our framework features: contextual con-
ditions, context-aware user role assignment (CAURA)
policies and context-aware role-permission assignment
(CARPA) policies. The main goal of this PMRM ap-
plication is to control the users’ access (read or write
operation) to different medical records of patients based
on the dynamic context information.
We present below two test cases, (i.e., the
emergency and normal cases from our application
scenario presented in Section 2) that highlight specific
policy requirements of the PMRM application, and
demonstrate how the dynamic context information
(contextual conditions) is incorporated into the
CAURA and CARPA policies.
6.1.1. Revisiting the Application Scenario - Emer-
gency Case
Consider the scenario when Jane (who is a general
physician) wants to access the emergency medical
records of patient Bob, an access request is submit-
ted to the CAAC PEP (which is a part of the Policy
Enforcement Architecture (PEA)) for evaluation. The
CAAC PEP forwards the request to the CAAC PDP,
which captures the applicable access control policies in
the policy ontology. It also captures the relevant con-
text information in the context repository. For Scene
#1, Jane’s resource access request is shown as follows:
< user = (Jane),
permission = (EMR(Bob), write) >
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TABLE 13: ‘cs2’ Contextual Condition Definition
cs2 = (User.locationAddress = “EmergencyRoom”)
TABLE 14: An Example CAURA Policy for the
Emergency Doctors
1 If
2 CAURAPolicy(caura2) ∧
3 User(u) ∧ hasUser(caura2, u) ∧
4 Role(r) ∧ hasRole(caura2, r) ∧
5 ContextualCondition(exp) ∧
6 hasCondition(caura2, exp) ∧
7 has(u, userIdentity) ∧
8 equal(userIdentity, “doctorIdentity”) ∧
9 has(r, roleIdentity) ∧
10 equal(roleIdentity, “ED00X”) ∧
11 equal(exp, “cs2”)
12 Then
13 caura(u, r)
The core policy ontology captures the relevant policy
constraints applicable to the user-role assignment: user-
centric, resource-centric and environmental context
information. The contextual condition cs2 (shown in
Table 13) is modeled/captured in our ontology, based
on the available context information. It shows that
the users can play the emergency doctors role from the
emergency room of the hospital.
Table 14 shows the context-aware user-role assign-
ment (CAURA) policy for emergency doctors. The pol-
icy states that the users can play the emergency doc-
tor role when they are present in the emergency room
of the hospital. In this policy, the access decision is
based on the following policy constraints: who the user
is (user’s identity), what role the user can play (role’s
identity) and under what contextual condition (the
location of the user). The CAURA policy for the emer-
gency doctors is shown in Table 14. The core policy
concepts are specified in Line# 1 to 6, the user specifi-
cation is shown in Line# 7 to 8, the role specification
(emergency doctor) is shown in Line# 9 to 10, the con-
textual condition (cs2) is specified in Line# 11 and the
context-aware user-role assignment (caura) is specified
in Line# 12 to 13.
The policy ontology also captures the relevant
policy constraints applicable to the role-permission
assignment. Table 15 expresses the contextual
condition (cs3) according to the relevant context
information (the health status of the patient).
Table 16 presents the context-aware role-permission
assignment (CARPA) policy for emergency doctors.
It states that the emergency doctors can access the
patient’s emergency medical records when the patient’s
health condition is critical. In this policy, the access
decision is based on the following policy constraints:
who the user is (user’s role), what resource is
being requested (resource’s identity) and under what
contextual condition the user sends the request (the
TABLE 15: ‘cs3’ Contextual Condition Definition
cs3 = (Owner.healthStatus = “Critical”)
TABLE 16: An Example CARPA Policy for the
Emergency Doctors
1 If
2 CARPAPolicy(carpa2) ∧
3 Role(r) ∧ hasRole(carpa2, r) ∧
4 Permission(p) ∧
5 hasPermission(carpa2, p) ∧
6 ContextualCondition(exp) ∧
7 hasCondition(carpa2, exp) ∧
8 has(r, roleIdentity) ∧
9 equal(roleIdentity, “ED00X”) ∧
10 Resource(res) ∧ hasResource(p, res) ∧
11 Operation(op) ∧ hasOperation(p, op) ∧
12 has(res, resourceIdentity) ∧
13 equal(resourceIdentity, 1) ∧
14 has(op, action) ∧ equal(action, “write”) ∧
15 equal(exp, “cs3”)
16 Then
17 carpa(r, p)
health status of the patient). The CARPA policy for
the emergency doctors is shown in Table 16. The core
policy concepts are specified in Line# 1 to 7, the role
specification (emergency doctor) is shown in Line# 8
to 9, the permission specification (emergency medical
records on write operation) is shown in Line# 10 to
14, the contextual condition (cs3) is specified in Line#
15 and the context-aware role-permission assignment
(carpa) is specified in Line# 16 to 17.
Based on these CAURA and CARPA policies (Tables
14 and 16), the CAAC PDP (Figure 6) determines
whether the request is “granted” or “denied” for
the submitted access request, and returns the access
decision to the CAAC PEP. Finally, the CAAC PEP
enforces the context-aware access control decision,
based on the applicable policies and the relevant
contextual conditions. If the decision is “granted”,
the requested resource is sent to the user; otherwise,
a “denied” response is sent to the user. For the
application example (Scene #1), Jane’s resource access
permission (“EMR write”) is granted.
This case study for the test scenario shows that our
policy framework is able to successfully make access
control decisions through context-aware user-role and
role-permission assignments. In this scenario, Jane
is not an emergency doctor, but he can play the
emergency doctor role from the emergency room of
the hospital and is allowed to access Bob’s emergency
medical records in such a critical situation. On the
other hand, when the context changes (e.g., Jane leaves
the emergency room, or Bob’s health condition changes
from critical to normal), the system will not grant Jane
the access to the requested resource. In general, at
each time of an access request or when context changes,
the CAAC PEP sends automated request to the CAAC
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TABLE 17: An Example CAURA Policy for the
Registered Nurses
1 If
2 CAURAPolicy(caura1) ∧
3 User(u) ∧ hasUser(caura1, u) ∧
4 Role(r) ∧ hasRole(caura1, r) ∧
5 ContextualCondition(exp) ∧
6 hasCondition(caura1, exp) ∧
7 has(u, userIdentity) ∧
8 equal(userIdentity, “nurseIdentity”) ∧
9 has(r, roleIdentity) ∧
10 equal(roleIdentity, “RN00X”) ∧
11 equal(exp, “cc1”)
12 Then
13 caura(u, r)
PDP for the applicable policies and the relevant context
information.
6.1.2. Revisiting the Application Scenario - Normal
Case
For Scene #2 in our application scenario, where a reg-
istered nurse Mary wants to access Bob’s daily medical
records (DMR), an access request is submitted to the
CAAC PEP for evaluation. Mary’s resource access
request is shown as follows:
< user = (Mary),
permission = (DMR(Bob), write) >
Table 17 shows the CAURA policy to play the
registered nurse role. The policy states that a user
having a nurse identity can play the registered nurse
role from the general ward of the hospital during her
ward shift time. The specification of the contextual
condition associated with this policy, named cc1 (during
ward duty time from the general ward of the hospital),
is expressed in Formula (20), using logical composition
(see Section 3.3).
The CARPA policy for the registered nurses is shown
in Table 18. The policy states that a registered nurse,
who is assigned for a regular follow-up visit to monitor
a patient’s health condition, can access the patient’s
daily medical records (resource identity is 2) when the
patient’s health condition is normal. The specification
of the contextual condition cc2 (the nurse is assigned for
the patient and the patient’s health status is normal) is
expressed in Formula (21) in Section 3.3.
Based on the above CAURA and CARPA policies
(Tables 17 and 18), we can observe that Mary can play
the registered nurse role if she is located in the general
ward during her ward shift time and consequently, she is
authorized to access the daily medical records of patient
Bob, who is hosted in that ward in his normal health
condition.
For the same scenario (Scene #2), let us consider
another access control policy: a registered nurse, who
TABLE 18: An Example CARPA Policy for the
Registered Nurses
1 If
2 CARPAPolicy(carpa1) ∧
3 Role(r) ∧ hasRole(carpa1, r) ∧
4 Permission(p) ∧
5 hasPermission(carpa1, p) ∧
6 ContextualCondition(exp) ∧
7 hasCondition(carpa1, exp) ∧
8 has(r, roleIdentity) ∧
9 equal(roleIdentity, “RN00X”) ∧
10 Resource(res) ∧ hasResource(p, res) ∧
11 Operation(op) ∧ hasOperation(p, op) ∧
12 has(res, resourceIdentity) ∧
13 equal(resourceIdentity, 2) ∧
14 has(op, action) ∧ equal(action, “write”) ∧
15 equal(exp, “cc2”)
16 Then
17 carpa(r, p)
TABLE 19: An Example CARPA Policy for the
Registered Nurses
1 If
2 CARPAPolicy(carpa3) ∧
3 Role(r) ∧ hasRole(carpa1, r) ∧
4 Permission(p) ∧
5 hasPermission(carpa1, p) ∧
6 ContextualCondition(exp) ∧
7 hasCondition(carpa1, exp) ∧
8 has(r, roleIdentity) ∧
9 equal(roleIdentity, “RN00X”) ∧
10 Resource(res) ∧ hasResource(p, res) ∧
11 Operation(op) ∧ hasOperation(p, op) ∧
12 has(res, resourceIdentity) ∧
13 equal(resourceIdentity, 3) ∧
14 has(op, action) ∧ equal(action, “read”) ∧
15 equal(exp, “cc3”)
16 Then
17 carpa(r, p)
is assigned to monitor the patient’s health condition,
can access the patient’s private medical records (PMR)
if she is present with the patient. Mary’s resource
access request is shown as follows:
< user = (Mary),
permission = (PMR(Bob), read) >
The same CAURA policy specified in Table 17 can be
used for the user-role assignment. It states that Mary
can play the registered nurse role from the general ward
of the hospital during her ward duty time.
The CARPA policy for the registered nurse is shown
in Table 19. The policy states that a registered
nurse can access the patient’s private medical records
(resource identity is 3), satisfying the contextual
condition cc3. The specification of cc3 (the nurse is
assigned to monitor the patient’s health condition, and
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TABLE 20: ‘cc3’ Contextual Condition Definition
cc3 = ((Owner.healthStatus = “Normal”) ∧
(interRelationship(User,Owner)
= “AssignedNurse”) ∧
(locationCentricRelationship(User,Owner)
= “Colocated”))
TABLE 21: Query 1
User(?user) ∧ Role(?role) ∧ Operation(?action)
∧ AccessDecision(?decision) → sqwrl:select(?user,
?role, ?action, ?decision)
they both are co-located and the patient’s health status
is normal) is expressed in Table 20.
Based on the CAURA and CARPA policies (Tables
17 and 19), we can observe that Mary can play the
registered nurse role if she is located in the general
ward during her ward shift time and consequently, she
is authorized to access the private medical records of
patient Bob, who is hosted in that ward in his normal
health condition (as she is assigned to regularly monitor
the health condition of the patient Bob).
The above-mentioned healthcare case study for the
two test scenarios guarantees the completeness of the
policy ontology model. We observe that the CAAC
policies for the two application scenarios are successfully
specified by instantiating the domain-specific ontologies
with the core policy ontology. Thus, the completeness
of the policy ontology through presenting a case study
from the healthcare domain shows the applicability of
our policy framework.
6.2. Correctness and Consistency
Second, we assess the correctness of the policy ontology
[28]. As such, we add some new domain-specific
concepts into the ontology and specify the relevant
context-aware access control policies. Also, we delete
some ontology concepts. To identify the relevant
changes, we execute some SQWRL queries [29]. Finally,
we verify these query results to evaluate the semantic
correctness of the policy ontology. To this extent, we
also assess the possible consistency of the ontology.
We have added some domain-specific concepts
(individuals and attribute values) into the ontology
and specified relevant CAAC policy rules (i.e., CAURA
and CARPA policies). Then, we have executed some
SQWRL queries to retrieve the query results starting
with the empty query. For example, we have added
a new Role named GuestResearcher (simply, GR) and
an individual named Tom (who is an instance of
GuestResearcher) to the role ontology. The researchers
TABLE 22: Query 1 result
?user ?role ?action ?decision
Tom GR Read Granted
TABLE 23: Query 2
User(?user) ∧ Role(?role) ∧ Operation(?action)
∧ AccessDecision(?decision) → sqwrl:select(?user,
?role, ?action, ?decision)
TABLE 24: Query 2 result
?user ?role ?action ?decision
? ? ? ?
are not directly healthcare members but they may need
to access some of the patient information. The details of
role ontology can be found in our earlier work [19]. Also,
we have specified the relevant CAAC policies for guest
researchers. The user-role and role-permission policy
specifications are already discussed in Section 6.1.
Table 21 shows a SQWRL query to retrieve
knowledge from policy ontology and Table 22 shows
the query result. The result shows that Tom is
authorized to access (read permission) the patient’s
medical records. For simplicity, the relevant contextual
conditions and other policy constraints are not shown
in Tables 21 and 22.
We have also deleted some domain-specific concepts
from the ontology and executed some SQWRL
queries to verify the changes. For example, all
the RegisteredNurse instances are deleted from the
ontology. Tables 23 and 24 show one of the relevant
SQWRL queries and the query result respectively.
The result shows no output, that is there are no
applicable CAAC policies for RegisteredNurse. When
any concept has been deleted from the ontology,
the implemented ontology-based policy framework
automatically removes the redundant access control
policies accordingly. This ensures the possible
consistency for change requests that is required for a
rule-based framework.
The query results in the above two tables demon-
strate that our policy ontology contains correct seman-
tic knowledge to instantiate the core ontology into its
domain-specific ontologies. In other words, the policy
ontology does not contain any conflicting and inconsis-
tent information.
6.3. Performance
In addition to the completeness, correctness and
consistency, we assess the performance of our policy
framework, where we measure the query response
time to provide resource access permissions to users.
We have conducted two sets of experiments with our
framework as applied to the PMRM application on
a Windows 8.1 operating system running on Intel(R)
Core(TM) i7 @ 3.0 GHz processor with 8GB of memory.
Test 1. The first test focuses on measuring the
response time of context-aware user-role assignments
(CAURA) in the light of increasing the number of
policy rules. We first codify 50 policy rules that
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FIGURE 7: Response Time vs Number of Policies
are attached to 20 different health professionals roles
(EmergencyDoctor, RegisteredNurse) according to the
contextual conditions. Then, the number of policies
is varied from 50 to 500 in increment of 50 with 138
different health professional roles [20]. In the case study
section (see Section 6), we have already codified several
CAURA policy rules. To measure the response time
of CAURA assignments, the average value of the 10
execution runs is used for the analysis.
The test results in Figure 7 show that the
average response time varies from 0.7 to 2.9 seconds
approximately, as the number of CAURA policy rules
changes and the size of the ontology KB (the context
and policy ontologies) varies from 293 to 1738 Kilobytes
respectively. We can see that the response time seems
to be linear, relative to the number of policies.
Test 2. In this test, we have evaluated the response
time of context-aware role-permission assignments
(CARPA) when the number of policy rules increased.
Similar to Test 1, first, we have selected 50 CARPA
policy rules with respect to 20 different health
professional roles, then, we have varied the number of
policies up to 500 in increment of 50 with the same 138
roles [20]. Each of these variations is executed 10 times
for the analysis. In the case study section, we have
already codified several CARPA policy rules.
The test results in Figure 8 show that the response
time increases when the number of policy rules
increases. It varies between 0.8 and 3.2 seconds
approximately, where the ontology KB size varies from
318 to 1926 Kilobytes respectively. Similar to test 1, in
Figure 8 we can see that the response time seems to be
linear.
In the above two tests, the computational overhead
increases at a linear rate due to increasing the ontology
KB sizes. At the point where we have specified
1000 policy rules (including both CAURA and CARPA
policies), it takes approximately 6 seconds to process
a user’s request to access the resources. Overall, we
consider that the performance is acceptable in such a
setup with limited computing resources. That is, we can
say that our framework has acceptable response time in
supporting users’ access to resources in a context-aware
manner.
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7. RELATED WORK AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
In this section, we review the existing literature on role-
based access control approaches in the context of the
dynamically changing information (e.g., the location
of the requesters) [2, 3]. Traditional role-based access
control approaches [4, 5] exploit user identity/role
information to determine the set of access permissions,
whereas the dynamic context information can further
limit the applicability of the available permissions.
Our review includes the context-dependent role-based
access control approaches that incorporate different
types of context information into the traditional role-
based access control (RBAC) process. We distinguish
four different categories of access control approaches.
(i) Temporal role-based access control
(ii) Spatial role-based access control
(iii) Spatio-temporal role-based access control
(iv) Other context-dependent role-based access control
7.1. Temporal Role-Based Access Control Ap-
proaches
The temporal role-based access control approaches [10,
11] extend the basic role-based access control (RBAC)
approaches [4, 5] by taking into account the temporal
information (e.g., request times of users).
Bertino et al. [10] have proposed the temporal RBAC
(TRBAC) approach, which extends the traditional
RBAC approach in order to support temporal
constraints on enabling roles. To describe temporal
constraints, TRBAC introduces a concept named role
enabling base (REB), which is composed of periodic
events and role triggers. For example, the periodic
events and role triggers in the REB state that the
doctor-on-night-duty role should be enabled during
the night, whereas the role doctor-on-day-duty should
be enabled during the day. TRBAC considers the
temporal-aware user-role assignments, however, this
approach does not provide adequate functionalities
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to integrate context information for role-permission
assignments.
On the other hand, Joshi et al. [11] have
extended the TRBAC approach proposed in [10]. They
proposed a generalized temporal role based access
control (GTRBAC) model that allows specification of a
comprehensive set of time-based access control policies,
incorporating the temporal constraints in both user-role
and role-permission assignments.
These approaches take into account the temporal in-
formation when enforcing access control policies. How-
ever, they do not provide ontology-based implementa-
tion to realize the formal approaches, what we have in
our policy framework. In our application scenario (pre-
sented in Section 2), Mary should not assign to nurse
role and consequently a nurse should not have access
to medical records of the patients other than satisfy-
ing some contextual conditions (during ward duty time,
from the hospital location, relationship between them
are assigned nurse, etc.). Other than the temporal in-
formation, we also consider other relevant context infor-
mation for user-role and role-permission assignments.
7.2. Spatial Role-Based Access Control Ap-
proaches
The spatial role-based access control approaches [12, 30]
extend the basic role-based access control (RBAC)
approaches [4, 5] by taking into account the spatial
information (e.g., locations of users).
The GEO-RBAC [12] approach proposes the spatial
extent (i.e., geographical location) of role, extending the
traditional RBAC approach with the concept of spatial
role. A spatial role represents a geographically bounded
organizational function. The boundary specifies the
spatial extent in which the user is located and enabled
to play such a role. The GEO-RBAC approach provides
spatial-aware user-role assignment and allows access to
resources based on the spatial role the user holds within
the spatial boundary.
Zhang et al. [30] have proposed a location-aware
RBAC approach, named LRBAC. Like GEO-RBAC,
LRBAC introduces the concept of spatial role. The
roles are automatically activated/deactivated by the
locations of the users. In LRBAC, both the activated
roles of the users and their locations are taken into
account for role-permission assignments, in order to
evaluate the access control policies.
These approaches take into account the spatial infor-
mation when enforcing RBAC policies. Similar to above
mentioned temporal RBAC approaches, however, they
do not consider other relevant context information for
user-role and role-permission assignments. Compared
with these location-aware approaches, we have pre-
sented an ontology-based policy model in order to pro-
vide the practical basis for realizing the formal model.
7.3. Spatio-Temporal Role-Based Access Con-
trol Approaches
The spatio-temporal role-based access control ap-
proaches [13, 31] extend the basic role-based access con-
trol (RBAC) approaches [4, 5] by taking into account
both the spatial and temporal information.
Chandran and Joshi [13] have extended the GTRBAC
approach proposed in [11]. They have proposed
a location and time-based RBAC approach, named
LoT-RBAC [13]. It considers temporal and spatial
context information as contextual conditions. It adopts
and extends the concept of role activation from the
GTRBAC approach, by incorporating the temporal and
spatial context information. In particular, a role is
activated by a user from the location l at time t. LoT-
RBAC allows access to resources if the location and
temporal information of a user associated with the role
activation is satisfied.
Bhatti et al. [31] have proposed a spatio-
temporal access control approach, named X-GTRBAC.
It adopts the temporal-aware user-role and role-
permission assignment policies from the GTRBAC
approach, and incorporates spatial context information
in these assignments.
These access control approaches consider the spatial
and temporal information when enforcing RBAC
policies. They have similar drawbacks in considering
only the specific types (temporal and spatial) of
context information for user-role and role-permission
assignments. Also, they lack in providing a
practical approach to incorporate the relevant context
information into RBAC process.
7.4. Other Context-Dependent Role-Based Ac-
cess Control Approaches
Over the last few years, there are several research works
extend the basic role-based access control (RBAC)
approaches [4, 5], where authorizations to access
resources are based on the user assigned role and the
relevant context information.
Kulkarni and Tripathi [15] have proposed a context-
aware role-based access control (CA-RBAC) model
for pervasive computing applications. Using this
model, they also present a programming framework
for building context-aware access control applications.
They consider user and resource-centric attributes as
the context conditions in role-permission assignments.
A user having a role and by fulfilling those conditions
can access the resources. In contrast to the CA-RBAC
model, the mapping of users to roles in our model is
dynamically performed in accordance with the relevant
context information. Different from this model, we also
present a formal model to specify two sets of context-
aware access control policies. In addition, our model
includes a language to express contextual conditions
based on the simple and complex context information.
Wang et al. [32] have proposed a context-aware
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environment-role-based access control (CERBAC) ap-
proach for web services. They consider subject roles
and environment roles as the access conditions. The
policy rules are executed at runtime to grant or deny
access based on both the subject roles and the environ-
ment roles. As such, access control decisions in CER-
BAC not only depend on the subject roles but also on
environment roles. In CERBAC, the environment con-
ditions are specified and modeled by the context infor-
mation and they are used to define the environment
roles. The unification of all relevant states (subject and
environment states) into a single concept (roles) makes
access control policies significantly easier to define and
implement. However, the approach is not suitable for
context-aware environments, because of the many roles
(especially, contextual or environment roles) making the
system very hard to maintain. In addition, it does not
consider the context-aware user-role assignments.
A dynamic role-based access control (DRBAC)
approach that incorporates the required credentials of
users as context information when making user-role and
role-permission assignments [33]. DRBAC only presents
the concepts and requirements of the dynamic access
control, without providing context and policy modelling
supports. Compared with this work, we have presented
both the formal and ontology-based policy models for
our context-aware access control framework with an
implementation (software) architecture and prototype.
Kro¨tzsch et al. [14] have considered access control
for web service based on the user role and presented
a policy model. This model is limited to considering
specific types of contexts as policy constraints. Similar
to the above approaches, this model has limitation
in considering dynamic user-role and role-permission
assignments in accordance with basic RBAC process.
Schefer-Wenzl and Strembeck [16] have proposed an
approach to context-aware role-based access control in
ubiquitous environments. They propose a formal meta
model that extends the UML, to integrate context
attributes into the basic RBAC process. In this
approach, the context attributes represent a certain
properties of the environment such as time and location.
It allows access to resources if this environment
context information of a user associated with the role-
permission assignments are satisfied. However, this
context-aware role-based access control approach does
not provide adequate functionalities to specify context-
aware user-role assignments. In addition, the approach
has limitation in providing a formal policy model to
specify the two sets of context-aware (user-role and role-
permission) access control policies.
Kayes et al. [21, 19] have proposed an ontology-
based approach to context-aware access control for
information resources. They propose a context model
for capturing and reasoning about access control-
specific dynamic contexts, and a policy model for
specifying and enforcing context-aware access control
(CAAC) policies. This policy model extends the basic
RBAC model, including the dynamic assignments of
permissions to users based on the relevant contexts.
However, this approach does not consider the context-
aware user-role assignments. Also, it lacks in providing
a formal policy model to specify and incorporate
the relevant context information into both the user-
role and role-permission assignments. Different from
this approach, our policy framework also includes a
simple language named context specification language
for expressing contextual conditions based on the simple
and complex context information.
Another recent ontological framework for situation-
aware access control of software services has been
proposed by Kayes et al. [34, 35]. The framework
includes a situation model for identifying the relevant
purpose-oriented situations and a policy model for
specifying and enforcing situation-aware access control
policies. The access control policies are specified in
accordance with the possible situations. This policy
model extends the concept of common role-permission
assignment in RBAC, incorporating the concept of
purpose-oriented situation. However, the framework
does not provide adequate concepts to model both the
context-aware user-role and role-permission assignment
policies. Also, it lacks in providing a language to specify
the different types of context expressions based on the
simple and complex contexts.
Recently, Hosseinzadeh et al. [17] and Trnka and
Cerny´ [18] have proposed the context-aware role-based
access control models. In [17], roles are assigned to
the users by the administrators and at runtime, users
can access the resources based on the roles and the
context information. The context of location and time
are taken into account in deciding the restrictions. For
example, in the healthcare domain a doctor is restricted
to only read the medical history of the patients after
office time or outside the hospital. In [18], the access
control decisions are based on the context information
(e.g., the range of IP addresses and times of the day)
in addition to traditional roles in RBAC. In these two
models, instead of considering two sets of context-
aware user-role and role-permission assignment policies,
they consider the static user-role assignment policies
created by the administrator and the role-permission
assignment policies in accordance with the context
information. They also lack in providing a formal
context-aware access control policy model.
7.5. Comparative Analysis and Discussion
This section presents the comparative analysis of the
existing context-dependent RBAC approaches. The
comparison is carried out in three groups: (i) the
spatial and temporal-aware RBAC approaches, (ii)
other context-specific RBAC approaches, and (iii) our
earlier context/situation-aware RBAC approaches, with
respect to the policy framework presented in this paper.
TABLE 25: Comparative analysis of the spatial and temporal RBAC approaches
RBAC Frameworks
Formal Model Implementation Model Evaluation
CAURA
Policy
CARPA
Policy
CSL CAURA
Ontology
CARPA
Ontology
Software
Prototype
Completeness Correctness Consistency Performance
TRBAC [10] P/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
GTRBAC [11] P/A P/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
GEO-RBAC [12] P/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
LRBAC [30] P/A P/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
LoT-RBAC [13] P/A P/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
X-GTRBAC [31] P/A P/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Our CAAC Policy Framework Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES
TABLE 26: Comparative analysis of the context-specific RBAC approaches
RBAC Frameworks
Formal Model Implementation Model Evaluation
CAURA
Policy
CARPA
Policy
CSL CAURA
Ontology
CARPA
Ontology
Software
Prototype
Completeness Correctness Consistency Performance
CA-RBAC [15] N/A P/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
CERBAC [32] N/A P/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DRBAC [33] N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Access Control for Web Service [14] N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Context-Aware RBAC [16] N/A P/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Context-Aware RBAC [17] N/A P/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Context-Aware RBAC [18] N/A P/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Our CAAC Policy Framework Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES
TABLE 27: Comparative analysis of our earlier context/situation-aware RBAC approaches
RBAC Frameworks
Formal Model Implementation Model Evaluation
CAURA
Policy
CARPA
Policy
CSL CAURA
Ontology
CARPA
Ontology
Software
Prototype
Completeness Correctness Consistency Performance
CAAC [21] N/A P/A N/A N/A P/A P/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
OntCAAC [19] N/A P/A N/A N/A P/A P/A P/A N/A N/A P/A
PO-SAAC [34] N/A P/A N/A N/A P/A P/A P/A N/A N/A P/A
Ontological SAAC Framework [35] N/A P/A N/A N/A P/A P/A P/A N/A N/A P/A
Our CAAC Policy Framework Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES
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Our analysis focuses primarily on the following
key features/aspects of our policy framework. We
provide (i) a formal policy model to represent
how to mapping between user and role and mapping
between role and permission in accordance with the
relevant contextual conditions (CAURA and CARPA
policy models). To this end, we introduce a
context specification language (CSL) to specify the
contextual conditions using the relevant simple and
complex context information. We also introduce (ii)
an ontology-based policy model (CAURA and
CARPA ontologies) and a software prototype
to realize the formal model. We demonstrate (iii)
the evaluation of the framework by considering
the completeness, correctness, consistency, and
performance of the policy ontology model semantics.
Tables 25, 26 and 27 show all the analysis
results in which we use “YES” when a feature is
available/implemented in the approach, “P/A” when
a feature is partially available in the approach, and
“N/A” when a feature is not available in the approach.
7.5.1. Comparative Analysis of the Spatial and
Temporal-Aware RBAC Approaches
Table 25 shows a comparative analysis of the RBAC
approaches which are composed of spatial and/or
temporal information [10, 11, 12, 13, 30, 31] with respect
to our CAAC policy framework.
In general, the existing spatial and temporal
access control approaches consider only specific types
of context information, without any context-aware
access control (CAAC) model. The access control
policies of these approaches are implemented under
the role-based access control and they depend on
context information composed of location and/or time
information. Different from these extended RBAC
approaches in which the role-permission assignments
are based on specific types of context information, in
our policy framework, both the user-role and role-
permission assignments are dynamically performed
according to the contextual conditions in terms of
diverse context information. Towards this end, we
introduce a formal policy model for specifying the two
sets of context-aware access control policies (CAURA
and CARPA policies), including a context specification
language (CSL) for expressing contextual conditions
based on the simple and complex context information.
Our policy framework also includes an ontology-based
policy model (CAURA and CARPA ontologies) to
realize the formal model. In addition, we evaluate our
policy ontology model and demonstrate its effectiveness.
7.5.2. Comparative Analysis of the Context-Specific
RBAC Approaches
Table 26 shows a comparative analysis of the existing
context-specific RBAC approaches [15, 32, 33, 14, 16,
17, 18] with respect to our CAAC policy framework.
Similar to spatial and temporal-aware RBAC ap-
proaches, the existing context-specific RBAC ap-
proaches support the specification of access control poli-
cies in terms of specific types of context information,
each of them having different goals and they are highly
domain-specific. However, there is still a need for a
context-aware access control (CAAC) framework to in-
corporate the relevant context information into the ba-
sic RBAC processes. To fill this gap, in this paper
we have introduced both the formal and ontology-based
policy models to specify context-aware user-role assign-
ments (CAURA) and context-aware role-permission as-
signments (CARPA) policies. Using these models, we
provide the architecture and (software) prototype imple-
mentation for building CAAC applications that enforces
CAURA and CARPA policies. We present the evalua-
tion results of the policy ontology model and framework
through the prototype and the results demonstrate the
completeness, correctness and consistency of the on-
tology model concepts/semantics, and its efficiency in
terms of response time as well.
7.5.3. Comparative Analysis of Our Earlier
Context/Situation-Aware RBAC Approaches
Table 27 shows a comparative analysis of our earlier
work on context/situation-aware access control [21, 19,
34, 35] with respect to our CAAC policy framework.
The CAAC policy framework presented in this paper
extends our earlier work on access control in the follow-
ing ways. In general, our previous context/situation-
aware access control approaches support the specifica-
tion and enforcement of RBAC policies in terms of rele-
vant context information. However, these access control
approaches and their associated policy models are still
limited in representing and modelling both the two sets
of context-aware access control policies (context-aware
user-role and role-permission assignments policies). As
a consequence, they are not able to offer the advantages
of context-aware user-role and role-permission assign-
ments in accordance with the relevant contextual condi-
tions. To this end, we introduce a formal policy model
to specify the two sets of policies. The formal model
also includes a simple language to express contextual
conditions based on the simple and complex context in-
formation. In addition, in this paper we extend our
previous software architecture and prototype [19, 35]
for building CAAC applications, providing mechanisms
and tool supports for modelling and enforcing CAURA
and CAPRA policies. Furthermore, this paper justifies
the feasibility of the policy ontology model by demon-
strating its completeness, correctness, consistency and
efficiency, whereas our earlier access control approaches
demonstrate the feasibility in terms of the case study
and performance overhead.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A general policy framework is presented in this paper
for context-aware access control following the role-based
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access control mechanism. Our framework significantly
differs from the existing access control frameworks
in that it considers context-aware user-role and role-
permission assignments and consequently supports
context-specific access control to resources by leveraging
the dynamically changing context information. We have
presented a formal model for specifying the context-
aware access control policies in our framework. By
introducing the concepts of context-aware user-role and
role-permission assignments, the association of users to
roles can be achieved dynamically based on the relevant
context information, and these users can access the
resources through the further dynamic association of
context-dependent roles to permissions.
Based on the formal model, we have developed an
ontology-based policy framework for modelling and
enforcing the two sets of access control policies: the
context-aware user-role and role-permission assignment
policies. The first set of policies specifies that users
can play a particular role when certain contextual
conditions are satisfied. The second set of policies
specifies that users having roles are allowed to carry out
an operation on resources when some further contextual
conditions are satisfied. When a user wants to access
resources at runtime, policy enforcement determines
whether or not an access request is granted or denied.
We have demonstrated the feasibility of the
proposed framework by considering factors like (i)
the completeness of the ontology concepts, (ii) the
correctness and consistency of the ontology semantics,
and (iii) the performance of the framework. The
evaluation results show that the core policy ontology
with its domain-specific ontologies not only deliver
complete, correct and consistent semantics but also
demonstrate its efficiency in terms of response time.
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9. APPENDIX A: CAURA POLICY SPECI-
FICATION
The following code fragment in OWL (see Definition
13) shows the definition of all basic classes of
CAURA policy: CAURAPolicy, ContextualCondition,
ContextInfo, User, and Role (see CAURAPolicy
ontology in Figure 4 in Section 4.2).
Definition 13. (Definitions of Basic Classes).
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“CAURAPolicy”>
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“ContextualCondition”>
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“ContextInfo”>
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“User”>
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“Role”>
Definition 14 shows the class CAURAPolicy has an
object property hasUser, which is used to link the
classes CAURAPolicy and User.
Definition 14. (‘hasUser’ Object Property Defini-
tion).
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID=“hasUser”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#CAURAPolicy”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“#User”/>
</owl:ObjectProperty>
Similar to Definition 14, we define two other object
properties hasRole and hasCondition. The property
hasRole is used to link the classes CAURAPolicy
and Role (see Definition 15), and the property
hasCondition links the classes CAURAPolicy and
ContextualCondition (see Definition 16).
Definition 15. (‘hasRole’ Object Property Defini-
tion).
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID=“hasRole”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#CAURAPolicy”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“#Role”/>
</owl:ObjectProperty>
Definition 16. (‘hasCondition’ Object Property
Definition).
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID=“hasCondition”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#CAURAPolicy”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“#ContextualCondition”/>
</owl:ObjectProperty>
Definition 17 shows that the class User has a data
type property userIdentity, which is xsd:string type,
while Definition 18 shows that the class Role has a
xsd:string type property, named roleIdentity.
Definition 17. (‘userIdentity’ Data Type Property
Definition).
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID=“userIdentity”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#User”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“&xsd;string”/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
Definition 18. (‘roleIdentity’ Data Type Property
Definition).
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID=“roleIdentity”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#Role”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“&xsd;string”/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
Definition 19 shows the class ContextualCondition
has an object property hasContext, which is used to
link the classes ContextualCondition and ContextInfo.
Definition 19. (‘hasContext’ Object Property Def-
inition).
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID=“hasContext”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#ContextualCondition”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“#ContextInfo”/>
</owl:ObjectProperty>
Definition 20 shows that the class ContextInfo has
two subclasses SimpleContext and ComplexContext.
Definition 20. (ContextInfo Class and Its Two
Subclasses).
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“SimpleContext”>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource=“#ContextInfo”/>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“ComplexContext”>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource=“#ContextInfo”/>
</owl:Class>
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10. APPENDIX B: CARPA POLICY SPECI-
FICATION
The following code fragment in OWL (see Definition 21)
shows the definition of all basic classes of CARPA pol-
icy: CARPAPolicy, Permission, Operation, Resource,
Owner, and AccessDecision (see CARPAPolicy ontol-
ogy in Figure 5 in Section 4.3). Note that we have
already defined the classes Role, ContextualCondition,
ContextInfo, SimpleContext, and ComplexContext in
Appendix A.
Definition 21. (Definition of Basic Classes).
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“CARPAPolicy”>
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“Permission”>
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“Operation”>
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“Resource”>
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“Owner”>
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“AccessDecision”>
Each AccessDecision class instance has exactly one
decision attribute value, which means the value of the
decision attribute may be “Granted” or “Denied”. As
such, it is not possible for the decision attribute to
have both “Granted” and “Denied” values for an access
policy. Definition 22 specifies the cardinality of the class
AccessDecision on the property decision.
Definition 22. (Cardinality Constraint Definition
of a Property ‘decision’).
<owl:Class rdf:ID=“AccessDecision”>
<owl:Restriction>
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource=“#decision”/>
<owl:cardinality rdf:datatype=
“&xsd;nonNegativeInteger”>1
</owl:cardinality>
</owl:Restriction>
</owl:Class>
The following OWL code shows that the object
property hasDecision links the classes CARPAPolicy
and AccessDecision (see Definition 23).
Definition 23. (‘hasDecision’ Object Property Def-
inition).
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID=“hasDecision”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#CARPAPolicy”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“#AccessDecision”/>
</owl:ObjectProperty>
The class Permission links to the classes
Resource and Operation using two object prop-
erties hasResource and hasOperation, respectively
(see Definitions 24 and 25).
Definition 24. (‘hasResource’ Object Property
Definition).
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID=“hasResource”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#Permission”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“#Resource”/>
</owl:ObjectProperty>
Definition 25. (‘hasOperation’ Object Property
Definition).
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID=“hasOperation”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#Permission”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“#Operation”/>
</owl:ObjectProperty>
The Operation class has a data type property action
(xsd:string type) in order to capture the operation on
the resource. The following OWL code shows the
property definition (see definition 26).
Definition 26. (‘action’ Data Type Property Defi-
nition).
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID=“action”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#Operation”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“&xsd;string”/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
The class Resource links to the Owner class using
an object property isOwnerBy (see Definition 27).
Definition 27. (‘isOwnedBy’ Object Property Def-
inition).
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID=“isOwnedBy”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#Resource”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“#Owner”/>
</owl:ObjectProperty>
The class Resource has a data type property
resourceIdentity, which is of xsd:string type (see
Definition 28), and the class Owner has a property
ownerIdentity of xsd:string type (see Definition 29).
Definition 28. (‘resourceIdentity’ Data Type Prop-
erty Definition).
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID=“resourceIdentity”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#Resource”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“&xsd;string”/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
Definition 29. (‘ownerIdentity’ Data Type Prop-
erty Definition).
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID=“ownerIdentity”>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource=“#Owner”/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource=“&xsd;string”/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
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